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A Model of Antitrust Regulatory Strategy
Allan Fels*
I. INTRODUCTION
There is a great deal of literature concerning the law and economics
of antitrust, but relatively little concerning its application and strategic
management by regulators. There is even less literature that considers
antitrust within a broad and systematic framework of analysis. Such a
framework needs to take account of the following factors: (1) the
character and goals of antitrust law; (2) the political environment; (3)
the operating capabilities and limitations of the regulator; (4) the
relationship of the agency to other organizations; and (5) the
relationship of all these factors.
Strategic management involves the fundamental decisions and
actions that shape and guide what an organization is, what it does, and
why it does it. It requires a broad approach that emphasizes an
organization's mission and the means of attaining that mission, while
being aware of the future implications of present decisions.
Accordingly, the strategy of an organization focuses on the role and
activities of the regulator as a whole, and on the relationship of
individual cases and matters to the general approach of the regulator.
This Article provides a model for the analysis of the strategy,
organization, and management of antitrust agencies, based on the
variables above and their interrelationships. It does not set out a
specific strategy or organization plan, but rather a framework to use in
devising such a plan. To accomplish this goal, this Article will use
models commonly utilized in the analysis of business strategies, adapted
to take account of the special features of the antitrust regulatory world. 1
An application of the model is made in relation to Australia's
experience of a period of vigorous enforcement of the antitrust law,
focusing on some of the links between the increased activities of the
regulator and the political environment. 2 The Article also includes a
* Professor Allan Fels, AO; Dean, The Australia & New Zealand School of Government.
1. See infra Part II (discussing Strategy Models).
2. See infra Part V (applying the models to the Australian experience).
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short discussion of the strategic issues that arise for a regulator in
seeking co-operation from other parties (called "co-producers"). 3
II. STRATEGY MODELS
There are three main variables that comprise the private sector
strategy model: output, market demand, and operating capability.
Understanding these variables enables a regulator to craft a competition
policy to fit the particular needs of the public.
A. A Private Sector Model
We can begin the process of establishing a strategy model for an
antitrust regulator by building on strategy models that have been
devised for the private sector. We shall consider the most basic of these
models-the so-called "three circles" model, widely used in business
schools-and consider whether in adapted form it can be of value in
considering antitrust regulation. The most basic private sector strategy
model focuses on three key variables and their relationships: (1) output,
or value added; (2) market demand; and (3) operating capability, as set
forth in Figure 1.4
BUSINESS STRATEGY MODEL
Figure 1: A Business Strategy Model
3. See infra Part VI (discussing cooperation with "co-producers").
4. This is an adaptation of the extensive treatment in MARK H. MOORE, CREATING PUBLIC
VALUE: STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT IN GOVERNMENT (1995).
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As can be seen from Figure 1, the model identifies three fundamental
variables for strategy. These are the value added by a firm (or
sometimes the profit generated), the market demand, and the operating
capability of the firm. The approach is to analyze each of these
variables in depth independently, and also to consider their
interrelationships, e.g., does value added match demand, and if not,
what are the consequences? The arrows shown in Figure 1 indicate
some key causal relationships. Market demand dictates the measure of
output and the organizational capability required to produce that output.
The effectiveness of the firm is highlighted by the interrelationship
between the variables. For example, the value added may not match
demand in some way, or operating capability may not be sufficiently
equipped to support the value added dictated by demand. In sum, the
model is essentially a diagnostic tool providing a checklist of key
strategy factors. But it also has normative uses if it is determined that
the aim is to maximize the value added or profitability of a business.
B. Key Questions for Regulatory Bodies
The private sector model requires adaptation for its application to
antitrust regulation. First, the concepts of value and bottom line profit
in the private sector are clear and measurable, whereas in the public
sector, the concept of value is more complex, multidimensional, often
contested, and usually not easily measured.
Second, the counterpart to the market, as arbiter and regulator of the
value of the activities of private sector firms, is the "authorizing
environment," or the political environment from which the regulator
and the law derives its authority, resources, and legitimacy. The signals
coming from this market are less clear than the price and quantity
demanded signals coming from the private sector market.
Third, the operating capability of a regulator has some similarities
and some differences with the private sector. While both business and
regulators focus on resources, skills, culture, and other underlying
drivers of capability, there are some special features of how the public
sector works. In particular, the operating capabilities of a regulator are
determined not only by its available resources but also by the coercive
powers afforded to it by law. The appropriate and effective deployment
of these powers is an important part of the regulator's operating
capability.
Despite these differences, the underlying notions of a business
strategy model relate directly to questions that arise for regulatory
2010]
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bodies. The business strategy model identifies the value added by an
organization, and therefore the objectives of the organization, as well as
its relationship to a governing environment and the link of its operating
capability to value added. The application of the business strategy
model to regulatory bodies is clear if we set out the key questions facing
a competition regulator.
There are typically three key questions for a regulator in any country,
developed or developing: (1) what should be done (i.e., what would be
of value to the public?); (2) what may be done (i.e., what does the
legislation permit or require to be done?); and (3) what can be done
(i.e., what is operationally possible, given the resources and powers
available to the regulator?). These are similar questions to those asked
in the private sector model. In other words, the key questions for a
competition regulator can be framed in a similar manner to those shown
in the private sector model. Accordingly, as explained below, the
private sector model can be adapted for use by regulators.
C. An Antitrust or Competition Law Regulatory Strategy Model5
Adapting the model for antitrust or competition law strategy depends
on a few key variables. The first variable is the public value, or the
value to the public or community or nation. The second variable is the
authorizing environment, i.e., the political environment that gives rise to
legislation, regulation, resources, and other political requirements that
are the source of authority and legitimacy for the regulator and values
that govern the work of the antitrust regulator. The third variable is the
operating capability, which includes the powers and resources of the
regulator.
This model is shown below in Figure 2, and its elements are
discussed in detail. The arrows suggest a line of causation, principally
from the authorizing environment to public value and operating
capability. As we will see in the following part, the model can be used
for diagnostic purposes and/or normative purposes.
5. The model in this Article is especially inspired by the work of the faculty of the Kennedy
School of Government at Harvard University, in particular Professor Mark Moore of that faculty,
and of colleagues (including Professor Mark Moore) at the Australia and New Zealand School of
Government, who have developed models of public administration which are themselves readily
adaptable to regulatory strategy. See MOORE, supra note 4; JOHN ALFORD, ENGAGING PUBLIC
SECTOR CLIENTS: FROM SERVICE-DELIVERY TO CO-PRODUCTION (2009).
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Figure 2: Antitrust or Competition Law Regulatory Strategy Model
III. THE VARIABLES
This Part of the Article discusses the nature of each variable briefly.
It is contended that each variable is a useful focus in itself for regulatory
strategy analysis.
A. Public Value
Any public sector organization exists or should exist in order to
create value to the public. Public value is a concept that refers to the
collective value created for the public of a country by a government
through services, laws, regulation, and other action.6 Public value refers
to anything that is of value to the public, and therefore, it is ultimately
defined by citizens themselves. Public value can be positive, negative,
or nil. Public value can be achieved by the private sector through its
provision of goods and services that the public demands. But this is
outside the scope of this Article except to the extent that the regulator's
actions affect private sector production.
Public value may be compared with private sector value, but there are
some substantial differences. Broadly speaking, the private sector is
judged by its results as measured by immediate output (as valued by the
6. GAVIN KELLY ET AL., UK CABINET OFFICE, CREATING PUBLIC VALUE: AN ANALYTICAL
FRAMEWORK FOR PUBLIC SERVICE REFORM 4 (2002), available at
http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/media/cabinetoffice/strategy/assets/public-value2.pdf.
ANTITRUST OR COMPETITION LAW
REGULATORY STRATEGY MODEL
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market). In the public sector, the contribution of a public agency is also
judged in large part by the results it achieves most often as measured by
its immediate outputs, e.g., successful prosecutions (or even by its
inputs, such as resources employed). There may be a single, simple
"output" or set of "outputs." This may, in practice, be measured by
some indicator of output, such as the number of successful court cases
(a somewhat controversial indicator). However, an added complication
is that the public sector is best judged, where possible, by its
contribution to economic or social outcomes. For example, a successful
competition regulator would be seen as contributing to the outcome of a
competitive, more efficient economy with lower prices and better goods
and services. In some cases, a measure of this may be claimed savings
or benefits to consumers. However, such outcomes are not under its full
control and are affected by many other forces. It is also often difficult
to determine the link between the activities and the outputs of an
agency, and the outcomes.
Unlike in the private sector, where it is mainly results that count,
value does not stop here for the public sector. Public value does not
normally rest on some notion of output or outcome. For most public
sector activities there are a number of additional features that contribute
to its value to the public.
The first such feature is the public value in the fair and proper use of
government power. Proper process and ethical behavior in the exercise
of the coercive powers of the state are valued highly by the community.
The responsible use of power contributes to community trust in
government. How effectively government power is used in the process
of getting (or not getting) results is typically an important factor in the
community's judgment of the value of the government's activities.
Failure to apply power properly is highly disapproved of by the public.
The considerable coercive power given to regulatory bodies,
including competition agencies, affords ample scope for both proper
and improper use of authority. Typically, regulators have the power to
investigate, litigate, recommend, and in many cases impose fines and
other remedies. They can also permit or prohibit citizens and
organizations from undertaking certain activities.
A key element of public value for regulators, then, concerns how
responsibly and properly government power is used. Power should not
be exercised in an ultra vires manner, nor through an excessive,
disproportionate, or bullying manner. A regulator that obtains results or
detects unlawful behavior by illegal or improper use of investigatory
powers, e.g., unauthorized phone tapping or by oppressive behavior, is
generally seen as contributing negative value to the public.
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Nor should there be a failure to exercise power: it detracts greatly
from the public value of a regulator if the regulatory agency fails to
apply the law and its associated sanctions in the way that the legislature
intended and the community expects. Generally, there are fewer
safeguards for the public from the failure to use power than from the
excessive use of it. In the most developed countries, the
underutilization of power is usually a more significant (if less
recognized) problem than the overuse of power because the latter has
many safeguards already in place.
The distinction between achieving outcomes or results that add to
public value, and following proper process, is useful in categorizing the
behavior of regulatory agencies and of individual personnel within
them. Some agencies and individuals seem to be at times focused
entirely on process-they have legislation to follow, investigations to
conduct-yet they pay insufficient attention to the amount and quality
of outputs and outcomes that they should be pursuing. Other agencies
may focus unduly on achieving results, at the expense of proper process.
An appropriate balance between outcomes and process is required.
Another use of the distinction between results and process is that
regulators find that if they are successful in obtaining beneficial
outcomes, their critics will often focus on allegedly poor process. For
example, when competition regulators manage to get cartels fined, or
executives imprisoned, critics of the agencies would not attract much
support if they criticized the substantive outcome. Instead, critics
usually focus on the processes that have been employed. For example,
they claim bullying in negotiating sanctions ("plea bargaining") or
unfair publicity. Likewise, where agencies place a heavy emphasis on
process they may be criticized for poor outcomes.
The other dimension of public value in nearly every field of
government activity is fairness-regarding either process or outcome.
The field of competition law has some special features in this respect.
Clearly, there is an important need for fair process. But should there be
other elements of fairness? Does the community, for example, expect
that the results brought about by the intervention of competition
regulators will add to fairness in the community? If one looks at other
fields of government policy, such as education, health, and policing, the
fairness factor is always present and it is often pursued at the expense of
seemingly larger or better outcomes and outputs. 7 Competition policy
seems, in some respects, unfair. For instance, it can put people out of
7. For a discussion of the issues, see JULIAN LE GRAND, THE OTHER INVISIBLE HAND:
DELIVERING PUBLIC SERVICES THROUGH CHOICE AND COMPETITION 12-13 (2007).
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business or work. On the other hand, there are fairness-enhancing
aspects of competition policy: it provides opportunities for competitors
who might not otherwise be able to compete because of the actions of
monopolists or cartelists. For better or worse, fairness plays a role in
the politics of competition law.
Figure 3 attempts to bring together the various elements of public
value: results, fair and proper use of government power, and fairness.
ELEMENTS OF PUBLIC VALUE
Results
* Outcomes
* Outputs
Fair and proper use of government power
* Not excessive
* Not underused
* Fair process
Fairness
• Fair opportunity?
* Fair outcome?
Figure 3: Elements of Public Value
The term "public value added" refers to the addition to, or subtraction
from, the collective welfare of a country that results from a particular
public policy or public institution. Value added is useful as a reminder
of the need to evaluate net benefits-that is, the value of outcomes
minus costs, including compliance costs, in achieving those results. It
also draws attention to the fact that value added can be increased either
by decreasing the amount of input per unit of output (e.g., by conserving
resources) or by increasing the quantity or quality of output with a given
amount of input.
Many discussions of regulatory strategy neglect one of the
dimensions of value added. They may one-sidedly emphasize the value
achievable by reducing inputs for a given output or the value of outputs,
ignoring the input costs. Some regulators may get locked into
increasing value by reducing inputs, but they ignore that they can add
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value by increasing output, quantity, or quality. Alternatively, they
focus on increasing output without regard to input cost.
An example of the application of this model in relation to
competition law is shown in Figure 4.
PUBLIC VALUE OF ANTITRUST OR
COMPETITION LAW
SUCCESSFUL COMPETITIVE
PROSECUTIONS ECONOMY
PROPER USE OF ETHICALGOVERNMENT 1 BEHAVIOR AND PUBLIC
TRUST IN VALUEPOWER GOVERNMENT
FAIRFPPR TUN 1 A FAIR SOCIETYOPPO TUNITY
Figure 4: Public Value of Antitrust or Competition Law
This Article is concerned with providing a framework within which
the strategy of a regulator may be framed and reviewed. It does not
seek to define or specify a specific strategy or mission. Accordingly, I
shall only briefly discuss the objectives of competition law and the
results that are sought. I simply note that there is agreement by most
people associated with competition law about its general objectives.
Generally speaking, an antitrust agency's objective is the promotion of
competition or at least the removal of barriers to competition brought
about by anti-competitive behavior. It does this with the aim of
achieving economic efficiency and consumer and general economic
welfare. There are some controversies about whether competition is a
goal for its own sake or not, and whether consumer welfare or total
welfare is the target. In practice, there are usually legislative and
regulatory deviations from these agreed goals regarding small business
protection and the promotion of fairness. Whatever these goals are,
they are not absolute: their pursuit is subject to requirements regarding
the circumscribed and proper exercise of power by the regulator.
Having determined the elements of public value, it is necessary to
determine which specific outputs and outcomes are sought. This raises
the question of measurement. Currently, measurement is a key factor in
2010]
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nearly all fields of public sector management, and most departments and
agencies measure outputs and outcomes, as well as inputs. Competition
agencies are adopting measurement practices more widely.
There are, however, special problems in measuring output and
outcomes and in evaluating their significance. Is a high rate of
litigation-even successful litigation-a sign of success or failure? If
the police force, for example, reported very large numbers of
successfully detected murders, would it be judged as a success or a
failure? Is the amount of cartel detection by a regulator a sign of
success or failure? How is the effect of general deterrence to be
measured? On what basis should the success of a merger law be
judged? Also, many factors affect competitive outcomes in an
economy. To what extent can these outcomes be attributed to the
actions of a competition regulator? How quickly are complaints dealt
with? Is a quick disposition of complaints desirable if it means that
serious complaints are not fully investigated? These difficult questions
imply not only a need to carefully design measurement programs and
conclusions, but also a need to recognize that reliance on measurement
without context can obscure what is ultimately a question of judgment
and degree.
As indicated earlier, in setting out this framework I do not spell out a
specific mission, purpose, or objective. These are important ingredients
in a strategy statement. What is more important in this Article,
however, is to bring out the underlying elements of a strategic
framework and to note that a regulatory strategy needs to be related to
the public value, the authorizing environment, and the operating
capability elements in the model. This is often not done in practice,
where there is often a rather technocratic focus on strategy plans, and
critical influences such as the authorizing environment can go ignored
or unmentioned.
B. The Authorizing Environment
The community is the ultimate arbiter of public value and of the
legitimacy and authority of the regulator. Its preferences are expressed
through legislation, rules and other directives, budgets, powers
conferred on the regulator, as well as many implicit or explicit
community values. Court decisions applying the law are also an
important element.
In this section, we therefore turn to the authorizing environment and
the question of the sources of authority and legitimacy that determine
both public value and what the regulator is authorized to do.
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A Model of Antitrust Regulatory Strategy
Some regulators would contend that an analysis of the authorizing
environment is irrelevant to their work. Their role is simply to carry out
mandates from the authorizing environment. There is no need to go
behind it and study its political influences. However, mandates from
the authorizing environment are often unclear, incomplete, sometimes
ambiguous, seemingly contradictory, and subject to frequent change;
therefore, understanding the mandates requires an understanding of the
authorizing environment. Also, anyone planning a strategy for the next
few years for an organization needs to take account of what the
authorizing environment might do in the future and what drives change.
This Article will not fully analyze the factors affecting the
authorizing environment, but some general points are important to
consider. First, an important characteristic of competition law is that it
encounters contradictory attitudes by those affected by it. Most people
and businesses want their suppliers, customers, and often their
competitors to be subject to the stringent application of competition law.
However, when the law is applied to them, they do not welcome it. It is
usually harmful to their interests, and they put these ahead of any public
interest considerations. They support competition law in general, but
not its application to themselves.
Second, this inevitably leads to strong pressures against competition
law. The size of the property rights involved in competition law is very
large. The losers from competition are often powerful, while the
winners may be unknown, dispersed, and weak. In just about every
country there is opposition by big business lobbyists to the existence,
strengthening, or vigorous application of competition law. If the law is
well-established and not able to be abandoned, they seek to have its
impact diluted. They may acquiesce in its general application but seek
soft application or special exemptions and special deals.
Third, competition law normally involves substantial government
intervention to achieve competitive markets, so-called "free competitive
markets." This is in some respects a paradox and it can create unusual
constituencies that either favor or oppose competition law. Some pro-
market-minded persons (libertarians) oppose competition law because
too much intervention is needed. Conversely, those more skeptical of
markets are often supportive of competition policy simply because it is
seen as striking at big business, in their view a worthy target in and of
itself.
Fourth, the authorizing environment is likely to differ from one
country to another. In particular, the authorizing environment in a
country with a newly established competition policy is likely to differ
from that in a country with a well-established competition policy.
20101
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Newly established laws are often politically weak, as they lack
established supporting constituencies. Likewise, the environment will
differ depending upon the stage of economic development. Clearly, the
political economy of developing countries will differ from advanced
economies, not only because public institutions and processes are less
robust, but also because such economies typically have less
concentrated corporate sectors outside control of public authorities than
is the case in the developed world. The absence of such constituencies
changes the authorizing environment substantially.
An understanding of the authorizing environment requires an analysis
of its drivers, including, but not limited to, interest groups, the media,
social attitudes, political parties, and the courts. Some of the influences
are shown in Figure 5, which also depicts the outputs of the authorizing
environment such as laws, budget expectations, etc.
THE AUTHORIZING ENVIRONMENT
AND ITS DRIVERS
GOVERNMENT POLICY NEEDS - N
POLITICAL PARTIES - /
SOCIAL ATTITUDES - 4
BUSINESS INTEREST_ 
_,,
GROUPS GROUPS - "1 [ AUTHORIZING
MEDIA ENVIRONMENT
COURTS
ADVOCACY
RANDOM EVENTS -
'EXTERNAL PRESSURES"-*
RESOURCE LAWS
ALLOCATIONS TO REGULATIONS
REGULATORS, COURT DECISIONS
COURTS ETC.
Figure 5: The Authorizing Environment
One approach to identifying the drivers of the authorizing
environment is to identify affected interest groups. This is important,
but it should be noted that there might be severe conflict within
seemingly homogenous business groups. There are often conflicts
between big and small businesses, and often between different sectors
and companies within the same industry. However, some important
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drivers cannot be characterized in interest group terms alone. For
instance, government policy is necessary because governments are seen
as responsible for the performance of the economy, and they need to
establish competition laws to achieve good performance.
Random events can have an important effect upon the authorizing
environment. In nearly every field of regulation, an unexpected and
trivial event can trigger major changes. In Australia, for example, a row
between a trade union-owned shop and a tire manufacturer in the 1970s
triggered the almost overnight adoption of a prohibition on resale price
maintenance. 8 The role of small events in triggering major legislative
and other outcomes has been analyzed by behavioral scholars of
politics, law, and economics.
Numerous other factors are relevant. International influences can
also be important: the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD), the International Competition Network (ICN),
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank can be
important drivers of the authorizing environment and of changes in laws
and competition policy. And the stage of the economic cycle can drive
the authorizing environment: antitrust law is often abandoned or
weakened during periods of depression and war. Some contend that
antitrust law is a "luxury good," only applied in good economic times.9
The role of advocacy is important in most competition agencies unless
they have a passive attitude to the authorizing environment-a matter
not pursued in this Article. Further analysis would delve more deeply
into the role and nature of advocacy regarding the likelihood of a
mismatch between public value and the authorizing environment. Of
particular importance would be the dynamic relationship between the
regulator and its authorizing environment, discussed in Part III below.
To conclude on this subject, it is important that a strategic analysis
takes account of the political environment of a competition agency.
This is important even in the United States, but it is especially important
in developing countries, where political problems and lack of support
loom large as determinants of the nature of regulatory outcomes. From
a normative point of view, it is also important to consider whether and
how much an agency should or can influence the authorizing
environment.
8. AUSTRALIAN TRADE PRACTICES: READINGS (John P. Nieuweunhuysen ed., 1976).
9. Daniel A. Crane, Antitrust Enforcement During National Crises: An Unhappy History,
GLOBAL COMPETITION POL'Y, Dec. 2008, at 3, available at www.idrc.ca/uploads/user-
S/i 2459370961DCrane-paper.pdf.
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C. Operating Capability
Strategy must also be formulated with reference to the operating
capability of an agency. The analysis of public value and the
authorizing environment may suggest a particular approach to the
application of competition law. Governments may seek outcomes but
not provide the resources or powers necessary to attain them. Experts
may recommend analytical approaches or forms of evidence that are
beyond the capability of the agency. But often this is not possible,
given resource and skill limitations, limited legal powers, and the stage
of development of an agency. Accordingly, it is necessary to analyze the
operating capability of an agency and its scarcity of powers and
resources as part of a strategy exercise.
Operating capability refers to physical, human, and financial
resources, culture, and organizational structure and arrangements that
exist to carry out the tasks of the regulatory authority or government
agency. It also refers to the legal powers of the agency, e.g., the powers
of investigation and decision-making. Accordingly, the notion of
operating capability differs from that applicable to the private sector not
only because of the many different characteristics of public sector work,
such as industrial relations arrangements and accountability
arrangements, but also because operating capability is affected by the
legal instruments of coercive power available.
Figure 6 sets out operating capability and its components:
OPERATING CAPABILITY
LEGAL POWERS
RESOURCES
PEOPLE 10
MONEY 0 OPERATING
CAPABILITY
SKILLS 
P-
CULTURE
INTERNATIONAL
ASSISTANCE
Figure 6: Operating Capability
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Antitrust law requires detailed enforcement and administration. It
differs from some other laws where, once enacted, there is relatively
little for the government to do. For example, a tax rate change or an
import tariff rate change, once enacted, requires relatively little
implementation by the government: the law is changed at the stroke of a
pen and nothing remains but for the market to get to work to reallocate
resources. Competition law is quite different. Once the law has been
enacted a plethora of activities must occur: the establishment and build-
up of an organization, the undertaking of investigations, and decision-
making in the light of investigations, judicial processes, educational
activities, and so on.
Substantial regulatory institutions need to be set up for the
implementation of competition law. They need to develop appropriate
economic, legal, and managerial skills. In developing countries, they
can benefit from technical assistance and help with capacity building.
Regulatory institutions are usually in a weak position at the outset of the
implementation process and this means in turn that the law must be
limited in its aims and reach. In the initial stages, the regulatory
institution must make hard choices about its priorities.
In most countries the courts have a key role. Courts may be viewed
from two perspectives: as part of the authorizing environment for the
regulator, and more broadly, as part of the operating capability of a
competition law. Either way, they may or may not perform well and
have good processes. Further, they often have difficulty with
economics-related issues. Despite this, many countries accept courts as
legitimate and broadly trusted forums for the resolution of important
disputes over property rights.
IV. THE INTERRELATIONSHIP OF THE VARIABLES
The next step is to relate the three variables to one another. The
arrows shown in our model indicate possible causation in the
relationship between the variables: public value is, for example,
determined by the authorizing element, so are the resources of the
regulator. The amount of public value that is generated depends, among
other things, on the operating capability of the regulator. In reality,
there is often a two way relationship.
One possibility, as shown in Figure 7, is that the three circles, or
variables, are aligned: that is, that the arrows run in straight lines from
one circle to the next. If they are in equilibrium this is not necessarily
cause for complacency, as exemplified by the authorizing environment
setting a low degree of public value on an important activity.
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Economics provides a well-known example of the non-optimality of
equilibrium. Keynes pointed out in the 1930s that the world economy
was in equilibrium. Demand and supply were perfectly balanced and
showed no signs of changing their relationship.' 0 It was in fact in
equilibrium at a 25 percent rate of unemployment. Likewise, as
explained later in this Article, in the field of antitrust law, an agency
may find that there is equilibrium at low value.
ANTITRUST OR COMPETITION LAW
STRATEGY MODEL:
EQUILIBRIUM INTERRELATIONSHIPS
Figure 7: Antitrust Competition Law Strategy Model: Equilibrium
Interrelationships
However, there may be a misalignment. Such misalignments tend to
be unstable. Consider some of the possible disequilibrium relationships.
First, public value may be misaligned with the authorizing environment.
This is shown in Figure 8. The vigor of the regulator in enforcing the
law and achieving public value may upset powerful interest groups.
This may have consequences via the authorizing environment, and
generate disequilibrium. This disequilibrium is unlikely to persist.
Something must happen to correct the mismatch. The government may
take steps to weaken the law, reduce the resources of the regulator, alter
its membership, or direct what it must do or not do (whether lawfully or
otherwise). In addition, the regulator may pull back on its activity or
10. JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST, AND
MONEY 23-34 (1936).
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through its actions, advocacy, or education activities bring the
authorizing environment into line with its view of public value. If the
regulator is independent, it has more ability to survive political tensions
compared to otherwise, but only for a time. This is because, ultimately,
a regulator cannot exceed the source of its lawful authority in the
authorizing environment. While the relationship between the two is
dynamic, a regulator must give way to binding changes in the
authorizing environment.
MISALIGNMENT
Figure 8: Misalignment of Public Value and Authorizing
Environment
Second, another misalignment may be between public value and
operating capability. This is shown in Figure 9. There may be great
public value in having a full-scale competition law with all the bells and
whistles of an advanced economy but if there is no operating capability
to implement it, value may not be achieved. Another possible instance
of mismatch exists where there is a global cartel that harms a country
without the capacity to prosecute it. Public value can only be achieved
by establishing operating capability; that is, the nature and extent of
public value depends upon the nature and extent of operating capability.
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Figure 9: Misalignment of Operating Capability and Public Value
V. APPLICATION OF MODEL
In this part, the Article will apply an aspect of the model to the
enforcement of the Australian Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) ("the
Act"). The modern Act was enacted in 1974 and although its essential
structure has not changed since then, there has been considerable
expansion and the addition of new functions. The Act prohibits anti-
competitive conduct. In particular, it prohibits price fixing, bid rigging,
and other such agreements between competitors. Unlike many
countries, "authorization" of certain otherwise prohibited anti-
competitive behavior is possible in advance (and granted sparingly) if
the benefit to the public exceeds the detriment resulting from reduced
competition.
The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) is
the principle enforcer of the Act. It may investigate and litigate in the
Federal Court of Australia in order to obtain injunctions, fines, damages
(in some cases), and other possible orders. In addition to ACCC
enforcement, for most sections of the Act, private enforcement is also
possible and frequent. In many instances, a right of appeal to the
Australian Competition Tribunal (ACT) arises from ACCC decisions.
MISALIGNMENT
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The ACT is headed by a judge but its membership includes an
economist and a person with business experience.
Unlike the antitrust law in many countries, the Act also encompasses
consumer protection issues and the regulation of former utility
monopolies (such as electricity, gas, and the telecommunications
sector). The ACCC also administers the largely dormant prices
surveillance laws. 11  With respect to national consumer protection
issues, the ACCC is chiefly concerned with misleading or deceptive
conduct or product safety. It also has the power to litigate against
market conduct that is seen to be unconscionable, where a party to a
contract had a "special disadvantage" to which the other took advantage
such as to make the contract unfair, unjust, or unreasonable. 12 Recently,
the Act has been extended to cover unconscionable conduct by
businesses against businesses as well as by businesses against
consumers. This is an example of unfairness considerations entering
into the law.
The perceived strong operating capability of the ACCC has
contributed to the view that the ACCC is a vigorous and capable law
enforcement agency. Governments enacting new laws have therefore
often decided to use the capacity and culture of the ACCC to get results.
Thus, the ACCC was also involved in Goods and Services Tax (GST)
price regulation for a time (although this legislation has now expired). 13
As mentioned above, since 1995, the ACCC has increasingly
regulated public utilities in the energy, telecommunications, and
transport sectors. The ACCC plays the role of the Federal
Communications Commission and the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission at least in respect to all competition and economic
regulatory dimensions. By international standards, this is a unique
feature of the Australian arrangements. This role was also conferred on
the ACCC as a result of recognition of its operating capability-its
economic sophistication and reputation for strong enforcement-and of
ACCC "advocacy," much of it behind the scenes.
11. See Trade Practices Act, 1974, Pt. VllA, (Austl.) (containing dormant price surveillance
laws).
12. Commercial Bank of Austl. Ltd. v. Amadio (1983) 151 C.L.R. 489.
13. See Trade Practices Act, Pt. V.B (containing transitional measures for the New Tax
System introducing the Goods and Services tax). It operated between July 1999 and June 30,
2002. While it is still contained within the legislation, it has little or no application.
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A. A Brief History of the Trade Practices Act
It took Australia nearly seventy years to enact an antitrust law that
was both constitutional and effective. A strong antitrust Act (the
Australian Industries Preservation Act 1906 (Cth)) was enacted at the
turn of the century that was modeled on the Sherman Act in the United
States. The new law was short-lived, being first emasculated on
constitutional grounds in 1909,14 and then further limited in 1913 by a
High Court and Privy Council skeptical about the benefit of competition
and unwilling to move beyond generalities about "unreasonableness. ' 5
In 1965, the Liberal and National Party Coalition Government
introduced a modest form of trade practices law. It had low public
value, being aligned with the conservative authorizing environment. It
too was found unconstitutional, 16 and repealed in 1971. Its
replacement, the Restrictive Trade Practices Act of 1971 (Cth) was in-
force for just over two years before being replaced by the modern Act.
The modern law, enacted in 1974, established the Trade Practices
Commission (TPC), the predecessor of the ACCC. 17 Initially, the Act
had a very large effect on the behavior of Australian business. The law
prohibited anti-competitive agreements and put a quick end to many
cartels and other forms of anti-competitive conduct. It also had an
impact on marketing and sales through its prohibitions on misleading
and deceptive conduct. The achievement of public value was
considerable, but it got ahead of the authorizing environment, and after
the initial "big bang" there was a weakening of government support for
the law and a corresponding contraction of activity by the Trade
Practices Commission.
By 1991, the Act was not being applied very forcefully. Relatively
few cases were being brought, and many of them involved smaller
businesses. Nevertheless, the TPC was concerned with the prevalence
of cartels, monopolies brought about by anti-competitive mergers, poor
marketing practices, and the like. The TPC believed the existing
antitrust framework achieved a low degree of public value-despite the
fact that the Act, on its face, provided for higher public value. The
14. See Huddart, Parker & Co. Proprietary Ltd. v. Moorehead 36 (1909) 8 C.L.R. 330
(discussing the unconstitutionality of the Act).
15. See Adelaide Steamship Co. Ltd. v. Attorney-General (Cth) (1912) 15 C.L.R. 65;
Attorney-General (Cth) v. Adelaide Steamship Co. (1913) 18 C.L.R. 30 (discussing the
Australian Preservation Industries Act).
16. Strickland v. Rocla Concrete Pipes Ltd. (1971) 124 C.L.R. 468, 499.
17. It is worth noting that the Prices Justification Tribunal (later replaced by the Prices
Surveillance Authority) was established in 1973. Eventually, in 1995 this body was folded into
the Trade Practices Commission to form the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission.
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trouble was that it was not being enforced vigorously enough. This
could have resulted from the authorizing environment: the Labor
government, like the predecessor Liberal National Party Coalition
government, did not want big business challenged too much.
The Trade Practices Commission decided to step up its activities in a
range of areas and thereby achieve what it saw as a much higher degree
of public value. First, the Act was made more effective through
vigorous and proper enforcement of its competition and consumer
protection provisions, with more litigation and much higher penalties.
This was achieved in a variety ways. The Commission made an effort
to break up cartels in overnight freight express, building products,
vitamins, power transformers, and other high profile cases with
multimillion dollar penalties. 18 The Commission also reinvigorated the
somewhat dormant consumer protection provisions of the Act. This
included actions for refunds to thousands of indigenous people for
improperly-sold life insurance policies; refunds of about $100 million to
285,000 of the Australian Mutual Provident Society (an insurance
company) customers over a misleading insurance policy; Telstra
refunding $45 million over misleading marketing for a wire repair plan;
Target televising corrections for an advertising campaign; and
intervention in the Olympic Games ticketing fiasco. The Commission
also increased the number of cases per year from about five to fifty and
increased the level of fines. This was brought about by successful
settlement negotiations with business and associated advocacy to the
courts by the ACCC, and a decision by the Australian Government to
sharply increase the maximum level of fines, which had previously been
at a ceiling of $250,000 per offense (it was increased to $10 million per
offense and in recent times has been further increased; most recently in
July 2009, after a long delay, criminal sanctions have been included in
the Act). 19 Finally, the Commission more aggressively used publicity
to advance its goals. Few weeks passed without the TPC (now the
ACCC) appearing on national television news, radio, or newspaper front
pages, having a powerful effect on public opinion.
The second change was the extension of the law to all areas of
business, including the previously exempt or ignored professions, public
utilities, and agricultural marketing boards. This was achieved by the
extension of the Act in 1995 following the National Competition Policy
report chaired by Professor Hilmer, and by the subsequent high profile
18. Graeme Samuel, Chairman, ACCC, Address to Launch 25th Anniversary of Miller's
Annotated Trade Practices Act (Mar. 29, 2004).
19. Trade Practices Amendment (Cartel Conduct and Other Measures) Act, 2009 (Austl.).
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application of the Act to such newly covered entities as the Australian
Medical Association.20 This Commission also took action against the
Royal Australasian College of Surgeons, seeking to put an end to its
closed shop by opening up the processes of selection, training, and
accreditation of hospital posts (although this was only partly successful
because of a lack of complementary action by governments).
The third change was to press successfully for legislation in 1993 to
alter the merger law from a dominance test to a substantial lessening of
competition test. Previously, in order for a merger to be unlawful, a
merged entity would need to be put in a position to "dominate" the
market as a result of the merger. This threshold proved to be far too
high, and was replaced with the lesser standard; that is, mergers that
substantially lessen competition would infringe the Act. The fourth
change was the application of competition law and principles to the
field of intellectual property. This was achieved through the legislative
removal of import monopoly restrictions for CDs, computer software,
and the many products that used copyright on labels and packages to
secure an import monopoly. An assault on the book industry's import
monopoly in the early 1990s was only partially successful. Also
important, though not yet implemented, was the Ergas report
recommending a cutback in the scope of the intellectual property
exemptions from the Trade Practices Act.2 1
Fifth, the ACCC began to apply economic regulation to such
monopoly, and near monopoly public utility infrastructure areas as
telecommunications, energy, and transport. This particularly related to
pricing and access issues. Sixth, the ACCC was involved successfully
in relation to the introduction of the Goods and Services Tax in 2000.
The ACCC, with much government encouragement, ran a very high
profile campaign to deter business overcharging of consumers with the
new tax.
Seventh, the Act was extended to provide enhanced protection of
small businesses from unconscionable conduct. It also applied to trade
union secondary boycotts, as happened for example in the 1998 national
waterfront dispute, another "top of the news" action. Finally, greater
public and business awareness and understanding of the Act were
achieved by telling the story of successful ACCC cases through the
20. See ACCC v. Austral. Med. Ass'n W. Austral. Branch Inc. (2001) 114 F.C.R. 91
(applying the Act to the Australian Medical Association).
21. INTELLECTUAL PROP. AND COMPETITION REVIEW COMM., REVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LEGISLATION UNDER THE COMPETITION PRINCIPLES AGREEMENT FINAL REPORT
(2000).
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media in all of its forms. The purpose of publicity, by raising public
awareness, was to make the law work better, to gain more support for
the law, and to help build a competition culture, thereby contributing to
good economic performance, as well as strengthening the authorizing
environment.
B. The ACCC in Strategic Terms
In my view, the ACCC sharply lifted public value during the 1990s.
There were two challenges; the first related to the relationship of public
value to the authorizing environment, and the second concerned the
required increase in operating capability to contribute to higher public
value.
The more interesting challenge was the relationship between the
Commission and the authorizing environment. Given that the
authorizing environment seemingly wanted low output from the
Commission in the early 1990s, what happened when Commission
output increased? Obviously when a regulator steps up output, this can
cause misalignment between the value added circle and the authorizing
environment circle, likely resulting in an unstable disequilibrium.
There are a number of possible scenarios resulting from
misalignment. First, the disequilibrium persists for a time, perhaps
assisted by the independence of the regulator, but will probably result in
re-establishment of an equilibrium outcome. Second, the regulator
reduces its output to bring it back into line with the authorizing
environment. Third, the authorizing environment is put under pressure
from interest groups acts such as legislation, budget cuts, appointments,
or directives (lawful or otherwise) to reduce the output of the regulator.
Finally, the authorizing environment adjusts and supports the new level
of output. This change may be brought about partially or totally as a
result of the actions of the regulator.
In fact, to a degree the authorizing environment changed. Much of
the change was brought about by continuous major publicity generated
by the regulators' actions and pursuit of publicity. This built public
support for the ACCC's policies. The publicity also activated the small
business and consumer lobby groups. The ACCC embarked on a
significant education and awareness-raising campaign in relation to
consumers, small businesses, farmers, and other interest groups. At any
rate, these groups became a counter to big business interest groups.
A further element in the authorizing environment was the courts,
which generally upheld ACCC actions. The ACCC was taking actions
within the law and using its power properly. Business critics were
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sometimes told by government that if they had complaints, they should
take them to the courts. The shift in the authorizing environment thus
reduced the mismatch between public value and the authorizing
environment. Nevertheless this is an uneasy relationship. Once a
regulator has litigation successes and apparent public support, interest
groups, principally big business groups, step up their lobbying and
public relations efforts to undo the apparent mandate of the regulator.
But the scenario set out in this Article does not apply to all regulatory
situations. There are some regulatory situations where the authorizing
environment's expectation of the regulator is ambivalent. This seemed
to be the situation regarding the Australian Prudential Regulatory
Authority (APRA), the prudential regulator of Australia's financial
institutions. Although it had a clear statutory role, there was little doubt
that the implicit and explicit messages coming from the government
were that APRA was not meant to interfere very heavily at all with such
powerful entities as banks and insurance companies. It seems to have
followed the government's messages, even though the legislation
seemed to require it to do more. However, a dramatic collapse of
Australia's largest insurer, HIH, in the late 1990s, caused massive social
dislocation. Within moments of the collapse, senior political figures
such as the Prime Minister, the Treasurer, and the Premier of New
South Wales condemned the regulator for its failure to carry out its
duties, notwithstanding their own preceding role in discouraging serious
regulatory activity on its part. The lesson is perhaps that the authorizing
environment is fickle and prone to change and as a result, regulators are
"damned if they do and damned if they don't" when it comes to
applying the law seriously.
C. Independence
Most competition agencies around the world are independent from
government. Does this make a difference in the analysis? Does
independence mean that a regulator can act as it sees fit, providing it
acts within the law?
Let us consider the four reasons for independence. First, the
establishment of an independent agency to carry out a regulatory role is
often intended as a sign by governments of their commitment to a
particular policy. It contrasts with the simple adoption of a policy by a
government, with implementation being in the hand of departments or
ministries. There is less credibility and permanence about these
arrangements and it is relatively easy to reverse their activities
compared with those of an independent agency. The public and various
interest groups pressing for a new policy often do not trust or support a
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government unless it makes the more serious and less easily reversible
decision to establish an independent regulator. Second, independent
agencies act independently of politics. Third, independent agencies
develop the necessary specialty skills. Finally, independent agencies
tend to adopt relatively open, transparent, and independent processes
compared to the normal processes of government.
The fact that an agency may be independent from a government does
not provide complete assurance that the agency is immune from
political pressures. No agency is completely independent. An agency
normally depends on the government, or sometimes the legislature, for
its appointments and resources. Because the government is able to
change legislation and regulations, it may be able to issue directives
openly or covertly.
Additionally, governments often set up independent agencies to
symbolize an apparent commitment to policy. If an agency decides to
display its independence, it may find its wings clipped quickly by the
government. The story of many competition agencies in recent years is
that governments established them as part of a symbolic show of
commitment to competition law, but they have come to have an
unintended quasi-constitutional role, seriously enforcing the law-often
to the discomfort of their political creators. Accordingly, independence
provides some buffer form political pressure, but it is not an absolute
buffer if it falls out of line with the authorizing environment.
D. The Regulator and the Authorizing Environment
An antitrust regulator is able to affect the authorizing environment.
First, it may do so through its actions, without any special public
relations or lobbying campaign. Winning or losing cases, for example,
generates a great deal of publicity and alters attitudes in the authorizing
environment.
Second, the agency may embark on a policy of generating great
publicity about its activities, especially regarding individual cases. The
public has a right to know about the competition law and its application:
people are entitled to know their rights as well as their obligations under
the law. Publicity campaigns also have a powerful effect of spreading
the culture of competition. Another important effect is to counter
untruthful criticism made behind closed doors to politicians and others
as part of attempts to weaken the role of the agency. In short, publicity
can shift the authorizing environment in the direction of accepting
output of high public value.
2010]
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
Publicity stems above all from strong enforcement, and in turn makes
enforcement more effective. Publicity surrounding individual cases has
important strategic uses. It educates all businesses, consumers, and
government. It also makes compliance with the law more likely in all
businesses, not just those involved in individual cases.
However, big businesses did not like the ACCC's publicity. The
publicity has built strong public and small business support for the Act,
the Commission, and for competition, thus hindering firms and
industries that wanted the law and its application to be softened.
Was the publicity legitimate? The big business community was
casting around for years to find some reasons why the public should not
be informed. They tried to throw the "trial by media" slogan at the
ACCC. The fact is, however, that hardly any of the ACCC publicity
related to matters that had not already been to trial and settled. Had the
ACCC engaged in trial by media over the years, there would have been
court reprimands. There were not. The only occasion when there was
an element of "trial by media" was during the GST period when the
ACCC was explicitly authorized by temporary "shame" legislation to
issue public notices condemning firms it considered had been
overcharging.22 At one point, the ACCC unwisely cooperated in
allowing photos of staff returning from a dawn raid to appear in the
media, providing critics with an opportunity to play the "trial by media"
card. Their push was resisted by Dawson Review of Competition Law,
which proposed a fairly mild media code of conduct to be determined, if
possible, by the ACCC with small and large businesses, consumers, and
farmers. 23 Little came of it.
Furthermore, the operating capability of the Commission did not
expand greatly other than through a merger with former Prices
Surveillance Authority, whose substantial inherited resources were
turned from price surveillance to trade practices law enforcement. The
global budget of the combined entities, however, only slowly increased.
Nevertheless, the Commission was able to conduct much more litigation
from its existing resources than in the past. However, there were risks:
had the Commission lost cases this would have caused financial
difficulties. Also, the operating capability of the Commission was
stretched. Nevertheless, in 2000 the government sharply increased the
ACCC budget for dealing with GST pricing issues. There was a thirty
22. See A New Tax System (Trade Practices Amendment) Act, 1999, Pt. VB (Austl.)
(containing powers allowing ACCC to issue public notices).
23. TRADE PRACTICES ACT REVIEW COMM., REVIEW OF THE COMPETITION PROVISIONS OF
THE TRADE PRACTICES ACT, FINAL REPORT (2003).
[Vol. 41
A Model of Antitrust Regulatory Strategy
percent rise in 2000.24 When the legislation expired the Commission
was able to keep the money (after a very thorough review by the
Department of Finance and Administration, which concluded that the
Commission had operated with insufficient resources for many years).
There are always interesting and important questions about the
operating capability of the Commission. Its work is becoming more
technical. In addition, it is dealing with enterprises which have more
information than it does about the industry environment.
After 2000, the number of Commission staff members increased
gradually from about 200 to 450 by 2003, and up to around 800 in 2009.
Better funding for litigation was also provided. Much of this funding
followed successful action by the Commission, and it enhanced the
operating capability of the ACCC, bringing it into better alignment with
its enhanced contribution to public value. Generally speaking,
resources followed public value, not the reverse.
VI. CO-PRODUCERS
These days there usually is a fourth important question to be
considered in most government agencies, including regulatory bodies.
This concerns whether the outcomes that the government or regulator
seeks to achieve require (or are hindered by) the actions of others. A
key question is then: What cooperation is required from others to
achieve the goals of the regulator? For example, cooperation of
businesses is required in order to achieve compliance with the law. The
cooperation of other parts of government is also required and so on. In
this part, I will address the issue of "co-producer" contributions in a
limited way.
There is an interesting contract with the private sector. In order to
achieve its objectives, a private sector firm also needs to cooperate with
other parties, e.g., suppliers of inputs. For example, this is most often
done by means of market exchanges, in which the firm buys various
inputs and other factors of production. If it is to be successful, the
regulator needs to cooperate with many parties also, but its relationships
with them are not usually conducted by simple market exchange
relationships, e.g., paying for goods or services.
It is useful to extend the model, whether regulatory or private sector,
to cover instances where those implementing the strategy need to
receive help (or may sometimes receive hindrance) from others in
achieving desired outcomes. Co-producers exist in many forms:
24. ACCC, ANNUAL REPORT 2000-01, at 5 (2001).
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businesses, the legal profession, private enforcers of the law, other parts
of government, foreign agencies, and the courts.
25
CO-PRODUCERS IN A STRATEGY MODEL
Figure 10: Antitrust or Competition Policy Strategy Model: Co-
Producers
In the simple case as shown in Figure 10, co-producers can be seen as
entities that can be harnessed to add to the operating capability of the
regulator in order to achieve greater public value. If the regulator can
persuade businesses to comply with the law then that increases the
25. Depending on one's perspective, the courts could belong to any one of several circles. For
the regulator, they may be in either the authorizing environment or the co-producer circle. For
the government official overseeing competition policy as a whole, they would be in the operating
capability circle.
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operating capability of the regulator and there is a higher public value
that results from greater compliance with the law.
Figure 11 (Co-Producer Relationships (1)) suggests a somewhat more
complex relationship between a regulator and a co-producer. Each may
help the other achieve its objectives. In the case of business,
cooperation with the regulator may help both business and regulator
achieve their objectives. Likewise, cooperation between the regulator
and another regulator may help both enhance their somewhat different
kinds of public value.
Figure I1: Co-Producer Relationships (1)
The next diagram (Co-Producer Relationships (2)) draws attention to
even more complex relationships because there may be other positive or
negative features to the relationship between a regulator and co-
producers. An important set of questions in regulation concerns the role
of self-regulation, co-regulation, and absolute regulation. These issues
are particularly problematic in regard to competition regulation because
self-regulation raises the possibility of collusion.
CO-PRODUCER RELATIONSHIPS (1)
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CO-PRODUCER RELATIONSHIPS (2)
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Figure 12: Co-Producer Relationships (2)
VII. THE USE OF THE FRAMEWORK
Each variable in the model is important in itself. But its relationship
with the other variables is of greater importance since each depends
upon and is influenced by the others. A great deal of analysis of
regulatory issues-whether by regulators, academics, lawyers, advisers,
etc.-tends to focus on one variable or circle and to disregard the others
despite their relevance.
Much discussion at seminars and conferences is about the public
value of a particular action or policy, e.g., there would be high value
from a particular merger law or from the application of the merger law
in a particular, sophisticated manner. This may overlook that there is no
mandate for such a law from the authorizing environment, or that there
is no operating capability of implementing such a sophisticated
approach. In addition, as has been mentioned, there is also a tendency
to emphasize only the input or output side of value added, and to focus
on narrow aspects of public value, e.g., on output measures without
regard to questions of process, or vice versa.
Some discussions within regulatory bodies may focus entirely on
what the authorizing environment will permit (whether this refers to the
political environment or to the courts). Such discussions would often
benefit from a greater focus on public value, and also on the possibility
of causing shifts in that environment.
A Model of Antitrust Regulatory Strategy
Yet other discussions within regulatory bodies focus entirely on
operating capability without considering public value or the authorizing
environment. The focus may be on maximizing the output given the
operating capability. It may neglect, for example, that the authorizing
environment could be well disposed to increasing the operating
capability with changed laws or more resources if it was persuaded of
public value. And sometimes, the operating capability of the regulator
can be stretched, without requiring additional resources, by greater
efficiency, more effective targeting, or by greater risk taking in
litigation (many regulators are very risk averse regarding litigation).
Our case study of the ACCC highlights some of the issues. Finally,
some problems are seen as beyond the capability of an organization by
virtue of ignoring the role of the co-producers.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This Article sets out a simple framework that provides a basis for the
formulation of the strategy of an antitrust or competition law
enforcement agency. A wide range of questions arise in analyzing and
planning the functions and organizations of competition agencies. This
Article seeks to provide a general framework within which the
important details concerning the working of competition agencies can
be considered from a strategic perspective. The fact is that strategic
factors impinge on most major regulatory decisions.
A feature of the model is that it focuses on the three key questions
which arise in every regulatory body. In essence, these are: (1) public
value: what should be done; (2) the authorizing environment: what may
be done; and (3) operating capability: what can be done. There is also a
brief discussion of the role of co-producers of value.
It is useful to focus on all these variables in depth. In addition, the
model emphasizes the importance of the linkages between these
variables and uses the ACCC experience as a case study of how to apply
the framework. This model is valuable as a diagnostic tool in analyzing
and understanding the strategy of a regulator. But it also has normative
uses.
This Article is useful for regulators and officials concerned with
regulation in analyzing the work which they perform, for officials in
government departments and ministers who may have to oversee the
legislation and its general application by independent regulators.
Furthermore, those affected by regulation (especially business and law
firms) may find it helpful in understanding regulatory decisions.
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This model has focused on antitrust or competition law and its
enforcement. There is an equally important dimension to national
competition policy: the strategy for dealing with the numerous
government laws, regulations, policies, and actions that harm
competition. A strategic analysis of this topic would have a much wider
focus than this Article. In some countries, the regulator plays some role
in these policies-usually a marginal one-as an advocate. This can be
seen as an added function of the regulator, but this role is only a small
part of the big picture.
This, in turn, takes us back to the question of what kind of
competition policy there should be. In the United States, generally
speaking, the antitrust regulators have a marginal role in dealing with
anti-competition restrictions imposed by government laws and actions.
A strategic analysis of the wider concept of a comprehensive
competition policy that addresses both private sector and government-
induced restrictions on competition-a policy much needed in most
countries-would be outside the scope of this Article.
[Vol. 41
